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Autonomy and Online Manipulation  
Michael Klenk1 & Jeff Hancock2 
*** 
The public is increasingly concerned with the abilities of data collectors, like 
Facebook and Google, to understand and influence individual users. Most data 
collectors rely on online technologies to do so. We define online technologies as 
connected data-gathering software, like social media algorithms, or hardware, like 
smartwatches, that interact with users. For example, by sending users push-
notifications or compiling content based on user preferences. 
This public concern has resonated in academia. More and more researchers 
argue that online technologies manipulate human users and, therefore, 
undermine their autonomy. We call this the MAL view on online technology 
because it argues from Manipulation to Autonomy-Loss. MAL enjoys public 
visibility and will shape the academic discussion to come.  
This view of online technology, however, fails conceptually. MAL presupposes 
that manipulation equals autonomy loss, and that autonomy is the absence of 
manipulation. That is mistaken. In short, an individual can be manipulated while 
being fully personally autonomous.  
Internet policy researchers should be aware of this point to avoid looking in 
the wrong place in future research on manipulative and harmful online 
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technology. Showing that manipulative online technology leads to autonomy-loss 
requires empirical testing, or so we will argue.  
1 Reconstructing the Manipulation to Autonomy-Loss (MAL) view 
We will illustrate MAL in more detail by discussing a recent article by Daniel 
Susser, Beate Roessler, and Helen Nissenbaum in this journal (2019). Their article 
presents a well-informed and lucid account of the potentially harmful effects of 
online technology. Since they articulate their assumptions about the relationship 
between manipulation and autonomy lucidly, their article helps to illustrate what 
is mistaken about the MAL view of online technology.  
Susser et al.’s argument involves three crucial claims. (1) A claim about the 
influence of online technologies on users (call this INFLUENCE). (2) A claim about 
the manipulativeness of online technologies (call this MANIPULATION). (3) The 
MAL claim, according to which manipulation equals autonomy loss. 
Schematically, their argument goes as follows: 
INFLUENCE:  Online technologies influence human users.  
MANIPULATION:   Online technologies are manipulative.  
MAL: If an influence is manipulative, then it is autonomy 
undermining.  
CONCLUSION:  So, online technologies are autonomy undermining. 
In support of INFLUENCE, they note how data collectors compile our online 
traces “into enormously detailed profiles,” which can then be used by “advertisers 
and others engaging in behavioural targeting […] to detect when and how to 
intervene in order to most effectively influence us” (p. 6, page numbers refer to 
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Susser et al.’s article). Moreover, they suggest that “digital surveillance enables 
detection of increasingly individual- or person-specific vulnerabilities,” including 
the exploitation of cognitive biases and other needs (ibid.). We take INFLUENCE to 
be well supported. 
They defend MANIPULATION by defining online manipulation as follows. 
Manipulation is “the use of information technology to covertly influence another 
person’s decision-making, by targeting and exploiting decision-making 
vulnerabilities” (p. 6). They then argue that, given Influence, online technologies 
plausibly manipulate users.3 Importantly, they claim that to exploit individuals’ 
decision-making vulnerabilities is to fail to “encourage individuals to slow down, 
reflect on, and make more informed choices” (ibid.). 
Finally, in support of MAL, they write that “manipulation violates its target’s 
autonomy” (p. 8). To unpack this claim, need to introduce their account of 
autonomy and then explain how manipulation jeopardises it. They define personal 
autonomy with two conditions. (1) One has the competencies (cognitive and 
affective) to consider one’s choices and to act upon them. (2) One reflectively 
endorses the ends (e.g. goals) and grounds (e.g. reasons) of one’s actions (pp. 7-8). 
They then establish the connection between manipulation and autonomy as 
follows. (Online) Manipulation, they write, “undermines a target’s autonomy in 
two ways: first, it can lead them to act toward ends they have not chosen, and 
second, it can lead them to act for reasons not authentically their own” (p. 9).4  
                                            
3 Though their definition of manipulation raises a number of critical conceptual questions 
(for example, whether covertness is a necessary condition of manipulation, and whether 
manipulation is pro tanto bad, as their definition suggests), the important point for our argument 
is how they link manipulation and autonomy. 
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In conclusion, Susser et al. argue that online technologies frequently 
manipulate and, therefore, undermine users’ autonomy, which they consider 
morally wrong in most cases. Thus, they claim that potential autonomy loss 
explains why “online manipulation poses such a grave threat” (p. 9).  
2 Clarifying the MAL view of online technology 
Susser et al. do not make the nature of the manipulation-autonomy connection 
explicit. What they write leaves open two options. A contingent reading of the 
claim (roughly, manipulating S often or mostly undermines S’s autonomy). A 
necessary reading (roughly, manipulating S always undermines S’s autonomy).  
The contingent reading is the weaker claim, because it allows for more 
exceptions, and thus the more charitable reading of their argument. However, they 
explicitly define manipulation as covertly influencing someone so that they fail to 
“slow down reflect on, and make more informed choices” (p. 6). So, it becomes hard 
to see how there could be genuine cases of manipulation (on their account) without 
autonomy loss (again, on their account of autonomy).  
Moreover, they consider it a sign of manipulation that “one did not 
understand one’s motivations” (p. 4) and that one was “directed, outside one’s 
conscious awareness, to act for reasons one can’t recognise, and toward ends one 
may wish to avoid” (p. 4). 
There are thus clear signs that support interpreting Susser et al.’s 
endorsement of MAL as a necessary conceptual link between manipulation and 
autonomy-loss.  
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3 Challenging the MAL view of online technology 
The move from manipulation to autonomy-loss does not stand up to scrutiny. To 
see why it helps to look at the conditions for MAL to be true. MAL is a view of a 
conceptual link between manipulation and autonomy-loss. It says that whenever 
one finds something that is manipulative, one has found something that is 
autonomy-undermining.  
There are many such conceptual links. For example, whenever one 
encounters a bachelor, one encounters an unmarried man – the concept ‘bachelor’ 
implies the concepts ‘unmarried’ and ‘man.’ However, there is a danger of jumping 
to conclusions here. We should be wary of letting contingent empirical 
observations confuse our claims about conceptual necessity. For example, it is an 
empirical fact that, say, many or most bottles are plastic. Nevertheless, we cannot 
conclude that the concept ‘bottle’ implies the concept of ‘plastic.’ The relation is 
empirical, not conceptual.  
The lesson is this. In an argument about bachelors, we only need to show that 
someone is a bachelor to get the result that he is unmarried ‘for free,’ by courtesy 
of a conceptual link. However, in an argument about bottles, we do not get the 
claim that a given bottle is made from plastic ‘for free,’ because there is no 
conceptual link between ‘bottle’ and ‘plastic.’ 
The MAL view makes the same mistake. It suggests that there is a necessary 
conceptual link between manipulation and autonomy-loss. But that is mistaken. 
There are cases of manipulation that are not autonomy-undermining, on any 
plausible understanding of personal autonomy.  
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Susser et al. understand personal autonomy in broadly externalist terms. 
According to externalist approaches, personal autonomy comes down to the extent 
to which the agent can appreciate and endorse her reasons for acting. The intuition 
behind externalist approaches is as follows. A person cannot wholly ‘own’ her 
actions, or act for reasons “authentically their own” (p. 9), insofar as she does not 
take some appropriate attitude like endorsement or understanding toward her 
reasons for acting. We will look at the two most influential externalist accounts in 
philosophy. 
One prominent externalist conception of autonomy goes as follows. The 
ability to assess and chose an action is fleshed out as an agent’s ability to evaluate 
her motives based on whatever else she believes and desires, and to adjust her 
motives in response to these evaluations (Christman, 1991). For example, 
indoctrinated people are not autonomous. Their indoctrination prevents them 
from evaluating doctrine in light of their own (potentially) critical beliefs and 
emotions. Susser et al. credit this conception as the basis of their account. 
There is an alternative externalist conception. On this view, the ability to 
assess and chose an action has been fleshed out as an agent’s ability to 
appropriately respond to a sufficiently wide range of reasons for and against 
behaving as she does (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998). For example, there are reasons 
for and against pursuing a challenging career (e.g. personal reward vs less family 
time). One acts autonomously when one can ‘feel the pull’ of both reasons for and 
against a particular act.  
Neither conception of externalist autonomy implies that manipulation is 
incompatible with autonomy. Consider the following example: 
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Breakthrough: Johannes cherishes autonomy above everything else, and 
he wants others to be autonomous, too. He creates a self-optimisation app 
called Breakthrough that helps users to free themselves of societal 
expectations and conventions and to determine for themselves the lives they 
want to live. Breakthrough reminds users of their goals. It points out how 
societal expectations may have contributed to their choice. It also creates 
opportunities for users to reflect on and potentially revise their motives and 
goals. It does so in light of the user’s motives and also in light of what the 
app’s advanced algorithm deems good reasons for doing something, e.g. 
eating healthier. The ultimate aim is for users to breakthrough. To abscond 
any habitual, unconsidered, socially-influenced action so that they take any 
action with full emotional and cognitive endorsement, in line with all their 
ends and grounds. Cordula is an avid user of the app and eventually breaks 
through. She would not have thought how much the app would change her 
life. Amongst other things, she stops seeing several long-term friends, to 
whom her relationship seemed merely conventional and not genuine, to 
focus prepping for a triathlon. She is ok with that, however, because she 
prefers being fully autonomous to her former life.  
Cordula is autonomous according to either externalist conception of 
autonomy. She responds well to reasons (e.g. reasons for eating healthier) and to 
reasoning (e.g. to eat healthier, given that she wants to be healthier and 
committed to that goal). Indeed, that is the very aim of the Breakthrough app and 
the very reason that Cordula is using it. Nevertheless, Cordula seems to be 
manipulated by the Breakthrough app. There is a sense in which she lives a life 
8 
 
that is authentically hers, because of the way she reflects on and endorses her 
motives and reasons. However, there is also a nagging sense that she may have 
given up too much of her life to the Breakthrough app. The app seems to exert an 
overpowering and illegitimate influence on her behaviour. She seems manipulated 
by Breakthrough. Therefore, manipulation need not undermine externalist 
autonomy, contrary to Susser et al.’s argument.  
That observation generalises and thus relies less on potentially problematic 
intuitions about particular cases. If someone, like Cordula, reflectively endorses 
an action (like eating healthier), we can always ask how she arrived at her 
endorsement. We can then ask whether those grounds are authentically hers. And 
so on – into a regress. Manipulation can sneak in anywhere in that line. 
Externalist accounts must allow it on pain of raising the bar much too high for 
autonomous action (cf. Gorin, 2014, p. 89). 
Let us recap. Susser et al. defend the MAL view, the view that online 
technology manipulates and, therefore, undermines autonomy. They defended this 
view on the assumption that manipulation equals autonomy-loss and they 
understood autonomy externalistically. We suspect that Susser et al. are not the 
only ones who embrace the MAL view on online technology. Other scholars also 
operate with a broadly externalist conception of autonomy and suggest that 
manipulative online technology undermine autonomy, though often less explicitly. 
For example, Frischmann and Selinger see autonomy in an externalist light as 
they link it to unhampered “self-reflection” and the ability to “determine one’s own 
intentions” (Frischmann & Selinger, 2018, 18, 153). They see that type of 
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autonomy in jeopardy as “we’re being conditioned to obey” by online technologies 
(2018, pp. 4–6).  
However, as we have shown, both intuitive cases and general theoretical 
considerations suggest that manipulation does not necessarily undermine 
autonomy on an externalist understanding. Manipulation does not equal 
autonomy-loss. The MAL view on online manipulation fails.5  
4 Implications for internet policy research 
The failure of the MAL view of online technology has three crucial implications for 
internet policy researchers interested in online technology and autonomy-loss.  
First, one should do better conceptual work to understand manipulation in 
such a way that manipulation does not equal autonomy-loss (cf. Klenk, 
forthcoming). The consequences of classification are not merely terminological but 
practical. Manipulative technologies would, and should, be subject to different 
policies than non-manipulative technologies.  
Second, one could do additional conceptual work to identify conceptual links 
to go from the influence of online technology to autonomy-loss. The concept of 
manipulation will not be able to do this work. But there might be others, like 
coercion.  
Third, one should do empirical work on the experiences that lead people to 
feel their autonomy compromised in the context of online technology. MAL 
depends entirely on the conceptual link between manipulation and autonomy-loss. 
                                            
5 MAL’s presupposition that manipulation equals autonomy-loss also fails on coherentist 
accounts of autonomy, which are the main alternative to externalist accounts. Unfortunately, we 
have no space to explain in detail how coherentist autonomy is compatible with manipulation. See 
Klenk (forthcoming) for further discussion.  
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Since we cut that link, we need new ways to show that online technologies subvert 
autonomy, if they do. This goes to show that this is not this just a semantic worry 
about the meaning of the word manipulation or the concept of manipulation. At 
stake is the genuine problem of how online technologies affect autonomy.  
5 Conclusion 
Online technology can manipulate us without compromising our autonomy. It is 
plausible that manipulation is compatible with autonomy, and that autonomy-loss 
can come by other means than manipulation. Hence, the MAL view of online 
technology, and Susser et al.’s argument that depends on it, fail.  
Several other scholars (e.g. Zuboff, 2019) make an equally problematic 
assumption about the link from Autonomy-loss to Manipulation (what we call the 
ALM view). If our argument in this paper is any indication, the ALM view is ripe 
for a reality check, too.  
Going forward, we will need more conceptual work on the concept of (online) 
manipulation, and more empirical work to test its links to autonomy(-loss).6 
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